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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3926 
___________ 
 
TYREE WALLACE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JANE DOE, Medical Staff; BARBARA HOLLIBAUGH, Unit Manager; 
MARY LOU SHOWALTER, Corrections Health Care Administrator;  
DR. KLEMICK, Medical Director; SCOTT WALTERS, Unit Manager; 
JAY JOHNSON, Counselor, JANE DOE, Plumbing Supervisor; 
RAYMOND W. LAWLER, Superintendant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:10-cv-00948) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 25, 2013 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Tyree Wallace, an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Huntingdon in 
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion to alter 
or amend judgment.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See
I. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  On April 28, 2008, while housed in the EA Unit at SCI Huntingdon, 
Wallace suffered a seizure, which he alleges rendered him unconscious for approximately 
one hour and forty-five minutes.  During that time, he was lying against an uncovered 
radiator in his cell and suffered severe burns to his face, head, arm, and ear.  According to 
Wallace, he requested to be transferred to B Block and the Special Needs Unit a number 
of times between 2004 and 2006 because of his seizure disorder.  He was first diagnosed 
in 2002 and was prescribed Dilantin, an anti-seizure medication.  He continued to take 
Dilantin from 2002 until the date of the radiator incident; however, he alleged that he had 
gone four days without medication prior to his seizure.  Wallace also asserted that after 
the incident, doctors at Mercy Hospital switched his medication to Tegretol and that he 
has not suffered a seizure since then. 
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Wallace filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in April 
2010, alleging that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing 
inadequate medical care and by demonstrating a failure to protect.  On January 12, 2011, 
the District Court dismissed Wallace’s complaint against Dr. Klemick in its entirety.  On 
June 17, 2011, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment with 
respect to Wallace’s inadequate medical care claim as to Jane Doe, Medical and 
Showalter.  Hollibaugh, Johnson, Walters, Lawler, and Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor 
filed a motion for summary judgment on Wallace’s failure to protect claim on September 
19, 2011, and Wallace filed his opposition on November 18, 2011.  On June 13, 2012, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed Jane Doe, 
Plumbing Supervisor, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for Wallace’s failure to identify 
and serve her.  Wallace subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the District 
Court’s judgment, which the District Court denied on September 13, 2012.  Wallace then 
timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Wallace’s timely 
appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying 
judgment for review,” we will review the District Court’s grants of summary judgment to 
Appellees and dismissals of Klemick and Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor as well as its 
denial of Wallace’s motion for reconsideration.  LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. 
Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 225 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); see also McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 
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F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]n appeal from a denial of a Motion for 
Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for review.”). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)).  This Court affirms a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 
claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 
F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate only when 
the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  “The 
moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable fact finder could find only for the moving party.”  Watson v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson  v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s orders granting summary 
judgment and Appellee Klemick’s motion to dismiss.  
, 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986)). 
See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 
318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  However, 
we review the dismissal of a defendant on the basis of improper or failed service of 
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process for abuse of discretion.  See Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 28 (3d Cir. 
1992).  We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but 
review a district court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and its factual 
determinations for clear error.  Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 
176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).   We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by 
the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe
III. 
, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional 
conduct by prison officials.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  A prisoner must exhaust these 
remedies “in the literal sense;” no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process 
should be available.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).  Exhaustion must 
be “‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning that the prisoner must comply with all the 
administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative 
remedies ‘available.’”  Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-103 (2006)).  “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and 
not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”  Jones v. Bock
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) grievance system requires 
an inmate to first file a grievance with the facility grievance coordinator.  
, 549 U.S. 
199, 218 (2007). 
See Pa. Dep’t 
of Corr. Policy Statement, DC-ADM 804, Part IV.A.8.  The inmate may appeal the 
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coordinator’s decision to the facility manager, and then may file a final appeal to the 
Secretary’s office.  See id.
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm;” and (2) prison officials operated with “deliberate indifference to [his] health or 
safety.”  
 at Part IV.C.1, 2 and Part IV.D.1.  Here, the record reflects 
that Wallace did not appeal the denial of his grievance alleging that he received 
inadequate medical care for the burns he suffered to his face and that officials 
inconsistently administrated his seizure medication.  Furthermore, while Wallace argues 
that he addressed his inadequate medical care claim against Klemick in a grievance filed 
on May 7, 2008 and appealed on November 5, 2008, the record reflects that nowhere in 
that grievance does he address that claim.  Furthermore, Wallace never submitted a 
grievance alleging that Jane Doe, Medical and Showalter provided inadequate medical 
care.  Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed Wallace’s complaint as to Klemick 
and granted summary judgment to Appellees Jane Doe, Medical and Showalter on 
Wallace’s inadequate medical care claim. 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 
F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997).  A substantial risk of serious harm “may be established by 
much less than proof of a reign of violence and terror,” but requires more than a single 
incident or isolated incidents.  See Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985).  To 
determine whether officials operated with deliberate indifference, courts question 
whether they consciously knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner’s 
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well being.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-44; Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 747.  Not only must a 
prison official be “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but the official “must also draw the inference.”  
Farmer
 Here, Wallace asserts that both he and other inmates housed in the EA Unit 
suffered radiator burns prior to his April 28, 2008 incident; however, the record contains 
no evidence to support his assertions.  Furthermore, Lawler, Walters, Johnson, and 
Hollibaugh all declared that they had never heard of any inmate suffering burns from the 
radiators prior to Wallace’s incident.  Accordingly, Wallace cannot establish a substantial 
risk of serious harm through a single incident.  
, 511 U.S. at 837. 
See Riley, 777 F.2d at 147.  Given that the 
record is devoid of any evidence that prison officials were aware of prior incidents 
involving inmates being burned by the radiators, Wallace cannot establish that officials 
could be aware of any facts from which they could draw an inference that the radiators in 
the EA Unit posed a substantial risk of serious harm.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Lawler, Walters, 
Johnson, and Hollibaugh on Wallace’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.1
Finally, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to Appellees on his failure to protect claim.  A motion for 
reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in 
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controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error 
of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer
IV. 
, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam).  Wallace did not identify any of these factors; instead, he merely 
reiterated his previous argument and attempted to introduce new theories of liability, all 
of which were available to him before he filed this motion.  Accordingly, we discern no 
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of Wallace’s motion. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See
                                                                                                                                                  
 1 Because Wallace’s claim against Jane Doe, Plumbing Supervisor was meritless, 
we need not determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing her 
from the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 
 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Wallace’s 
motion for the appointment of counsel is denied. 
